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Résumé
Cet article part de l’observation selon laquelle les pouvoirs publics ont tendance à compenser financièrement les
victimes de catastrophes naturelles. Ainsi, l’objectif de ce papier est d’analyser l’impact de tels programmes
publics sur les dépenses d’assurance et les activités de gestion forestière des propriétaires forestiers privés non-
industriels.  Les  auteurs  développent  un  modèle  théorique  de  demande  d’assurance  et  d’activités  de  gestion
forestière dans un contexte risqué comprenant un nombre fini d’états de la nature et une perte proportionnelle à
la valeur du peuplement forestier. Le modèle prévoit les dépenses privées optimales pour l’assurance et les
pratiques de gestion forestière.  Les effets de statique comparative des  variations du prix de  l’assurance,  de
l’attitude envers le risque, de la valeur du peuplement forestier ainsi que de l’ampleur et de la fréquence des
compensations publiques sur les dépenses d’assurance et les activités de gestion forestière sont fournis. Leurs
implications en termes de politiques publiques sont également examinées. Cette analyse montre que délivrer une
aide financière publique après une catastrophe peut  réduire les incitations des propriétaires forestiers privés non-
industriels à investir dans l’assurance et dans les mesures de prévention avant une catastrophe.
Mots clés : gestion forestière, risque, assurance, compensation publique, statique comparative.
Abstract
Politicians have a tendency to compensate victims of natural disasters. This article explores the impact of such
public  relief  programmes  on  a  non-industrial  private  forest  owner’s  insurance  expenditures  or  on  forest
management activities. We develop a theoretical model of insurance demand or forest management activities in a
risky context with a finite number of states of nature and a loss proportional to the forest value. The model
predicts the optimal private expenditures of insurance and forest management activities. The comparative static
effects of variations in the level of insurance price, attitudes toward risk, stand value, and the magnitude and
frequency of the public compensation on insurance expenditures and on forest management activities are also
characterised, and their implications for government policies are examined. Providing public financial assistance
after a natural catastrophe may reduce the incentives of nonindustrial private forest owners to invest in insurance
and protective measures prior to a disaster.
Key words : Forest management, risk, insurance, public compensation, comparative statics.
Classification JEL : D81, Q23, Q54, Q58
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In Europe, several public programmes (Bianco, 1998; CEC, 2006; FAO 2007) encourage
non-industrial private forest owners1 to reduce the risk of property damage from natural dis-
asters. These programmes recommend risk management activities that are likely to reduce
the potential ﬁnancial losses due to natural disasters. Principally, such activities are private
insurance or stand management practices such as the installation of artiﬁcial ﬁrebreaks or
other measures that facilitate access to the stand. However, it has been observed in Europe
that insurance may be an unusual practice (for example, in Germany and in France, only 2%
and 5% of the private forest owners, respectively, are insured against windstorms, whereas
roughly 68% of non-industrial private forest owners in Denmark and more than 90% in Swe-
den are covered against these risks), and risk stand management activities are not generally
used (Holecy and Hanewinkel, 2006). Moreover, over the last decades, in many European
countries aﬀected by severe storms, social and political considerations have forced public
authorities to grant ﬁnancial help to victims of windstorm disasters through compensation
programmes, grants or low-interest loans, in spite of the existence of private insurance, prin-
cipally in countries where few non-industrial private owners are insured. For example, after
the natural catastrophes of 1999, the German government set up a programme of public ﬁ-
nancial assistance of 15.3 million euros. In France, the ‘Plan Chablis’ was implemented after
the storms, Lothar and Martin, in 1999, for a total of 91.5 million euros. More recently, after
Hurricane Gudrun in 2005, the Danish government gave a public lump-sum grant to replant
and clear the storm-felled forest areas for each forest owner with damaged forest, but only
for owners who had purchased a basic forest insurance policy. After the same windstorm,
1Non-industrial private forest owners hold roughly 67% of forested areas in European countries.
1we can observe that the Swedish government allocated 2 million euros, not to compensate
the ﬁnancial losses of private forest owners but only to facilitate the evaluation of damages
and to inform owners. These common public practices are generally implemented regardless
of the disincentives created for eﬃcient expenditures on insurance and/or on forest manage-
ment practices of non-industrial private forest owners.
These features raise several interesting issues: (i) What are the eﬀects of public compen-
sation for disaster damages on private insurance or forest management decisions? (ii) Are
public relief programmes really a substitute for private coverage decisions? (iii) What are
the diﬀerences of the eﬀect of public post-disaster compensations contingent or not on cov-
erage measures? The purpose of this paper is to analyse these unexplored issues. We have
adopted a normative approach designed to provide a basic framework for studying these
points. Before describing our model, we present a brief overview of the relevant existing
literature, which provides additional motivation for our analysis.
Birot and Gollier (2001) were the ﬁrst to indicate the implications of the expectation of
public subsidies for insurance, but they do not explicitly formalise the interaction between
insurance, forest management and public compensation programmes. More generally, some
authors such as Kaplow (1991), Harrington (2000), Gollier (2001), Smetters (2005), Kun-
reuther and Pauly (2006) claim that the expectation of liberal disaster assistance following
a catastrophic event can be a factor limiting homeowners to purchase insurance. Kim and
Schlesinger (2005) have examined the impact of government assistance programmes on the
demand for insurance in a simple two-state model of insurance demand with adverse selec-
2tion. They found that government assistance alters agents’ demand for insurance coverage.
In the same way, Lewis and Nickerson (1989) analysed the eﬀect of public disaster relief
programmes on individual self-insurance expenditures in an expected-utility model under
conditions of limited liability for ﬁnancial loss and without market insurance. They com-
pared the alternative levels of self-insurance activities that are optimal and that minimise
the expected costs of public compensation. They found that an increase in the minimum
property value guaranteed by public compensation has similar eﬀects on both optimal levels
of self-insurance expenditures at the qualitative level. These eﬀects depend on the nature of
the technology by which individuals protect their assets (risk-reducing or risky investments).
This paper explores various issues associated with insurance and risk stand management
behaviour of non-industrial private forest owners when they face public compensation for dis-
aster damages that guarantee some minimum wealth levels. We develop a theoretical model
of insurance or forest management practices that emphasizes the interaction between market
insurance or sylvicultural activities and public compensation programmes. We consider a
risk-averse expected-utility-maximising forest owner exposed to a loss due to natural risk.
This paper extends earlier analyses in several important respects. First, we generalise the
traditional two-state model to a more representative framework with many states of nature
and a loss depending on the forest value. In the literature, a two-state model is generally
considered where an individual faces the risk of losing an exogenous ﬁnancial amount L with
probability p or not. Such a framework is not adapted to represent the risk in the forest
sector because a natural disturbance occurs each time with a diﬀerent intensity and the
damages are never the same. In the same way, the loss in forest depends on the value of the
3forest. For this reason, we consider a loss depending on the value of the stand. Second, we
develop the comparative statics of insurance and forest management by analysing the eﬀects
of insurance price, attitudes toward risk, stand value, and the magnitude and frequency of
the public compensation on the optimal coverage decisions. Finally, we examine the eﬀects
of public ﬁnancial assistance programmes on the forest owner’s optimal coverage decisions.
It is shown that for insurance as well as for forest management activities, public assistance
programmes remove the private forest owner’s incentives. However, we show that measures
to adapt public ﬁnancial assistance programmes to insurance coverage or to forest manage-
ment activities makes these practices more attractive to the forest owners than when public
assistance is not adapted to protection measures.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of insurance
demand aﬀected by the presence of government ﬁnancial assistance programmes. We par-
ticularly focus on the analysis of comparative static results with respect to the price of
insurance, the risk preferences of the forest owner, and the value of the forest. We then
examine the eﬀects of such a programme on the optimal coverage choices. In Section 3, we
consider a model of forest management activities within the context of natural risk with
many states of nature and a loss function of the value of the forest. After determining some
results of comparative statics, we study the impact of government assistance programmes on
optimal forest management decisions. In Section 4, we make some public policy recommen-
dations that could be applied at the governmental level. Section 5 provides some concluding
comments.
42 Optimal insurance activity in the context of a public
programme
The analysis of insurance choices has received considerable attention in the literature. The
standard theoretical framework used to study insurance demand (Mossin, 1968; Schlesinger,
2000) seems to be adapted to representing the problem of insurance in risky forest manage-
ment. Only a few previous works in the area of experimental economics (Mc Clelland et al.,
1993; Ganderton et al., 2000; Stenger, 2004; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006) have analysed in-
surance demand within the context of natural risks. Stenger (2004) deals with non-industrial
private forest owners’ insurance activities toward natural risks. She shows that forest owners
tend to buy insurance when windstorms are frequent. When the windstorms are frequent, the
rejection of insurance is due more to potential loss than to the probability of occurrence. In
this paper, we propose a theoretical model of forest insurance against natural risks. We ﬁrst
analyse the insurance decision of a non-industrial forest owner without public compensation.
We then concentrate on the problem of insurance choices with public ﬁnancial assistance.
In both of these cases, we used the framework described below.
Consider a private forest owner who possesses an even-aged forest that procures an op-
timal revenue R that corresponds to the commercial value of a stand of trees at the optimal
cut period. This revenue is subject to a possible risk of windstorm or ﬁre and then to a
possible loss. Let ε ǫ [0,ε] denote a random variable representing a state of nature, and
let L(R,ε) denote the size of loss when ε occurs that is a function of the revenue from the
stand. Without loss of generality, we assume that a larger ε represents a worse state so that
5Lε (R,ε) =
∂L(R,ε)
∂ε > 0 (henceforth, subscripts denote partial derivatives). To include the
possibility of no loss, we have L(R,0) = 0. Let f (ε) and F (ε) denote the density and distri-
bution functions for ε, respectively. We also assume that 0 ≤ L(R,ε) ≤ R and LR (R,ε) > 0.
The loss is always lower than the value of timber production. When the revenue from wood
increases, ﬁnancial loss rises as well.
2.1 Optimal insurance decision without a public programme
The private forest owner can purchase a co-insurance policy. This insurance contract consists
of an indemnity function where the private forest owner receives payment αL(R,ε) in the
event of a loss L(R,ε), as well as a premium P, which must be paid no matter what. The
forest owner chooses α between 0 and 1. The premium for the given indemnity function
takes the form P(R) = (1 + λ)α (R) with  (R) = E [L(R,ε)] where λ ≥ 0 is the loading
factor. We assume that there are no moral hazard problems and that the forest owner will
not be more careless in forest management as a result of purchasing insurance. Furthermore,
we assume that the insurer has the same information about risk as the forest owner, so that
there will be no adverse selection problems.
Concerning the insurance market, the problem of the private forest owner is to choose α




U [R − (1 − α)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f (ε)dε (1)
where U [.] is a strictly increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.






∗)](L(R,ε) − (1 + λ) (R))
i
f (ε)dε = 0 (2)
where W(α∗) = R − (1 − α∗)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α∗ (R).
The problem of insurance here is quasi identical to the one analysed by Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (1992) or by Schlesinger (2000)2, except that the loss here is a function of the initial
wealth. This diﬀerence does not change the result, referred to as Mossin’s Theorem3 (Mossin,
1968): if proportional insurance is available at a fair price (λ = 0), then full coverage
is optimal (α∗ = 1); if the price of insurance includes a positive premium loading factor
(λ > 0), then the partial insurance is optimal (α∗ < 1). There is a critical value of the loading
factor for which the forest owner switches to zero coverage. Schlesinger (2000) examines the
results of comparative statics with respect to changes in price. The author concludes that
with a positive insurance loading factor, insurance cannot be a Giﬀen good if preferences
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA),
but may be a Giﬀen good if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Schlesinger (2000) also studies the impact of change in risk aversion on the optimal insurance
decision. He concludes that an increase in the individual’s degree of risk aversion at all levels
of wealth will lead to an increase in the optimal level of coverage. It is easy to show that
these two conclusions are also veriﬁed in our insurance model. Schlesinger (2000) shows that
for an increase in the initial wealth, the optimal insurance level will decrease, be invariant or
2We do not develop the total analysis of this optimal insurance decision here. The interested reader
can refer to this paper in order to have more precisions about the basic theoretical model of proportional
co-insurance and the results of comparative statics.
3The proof of Mossin’s Theorem within this framework is available from the authors upon request.
7increase under DARA, CARA or IARA, respectively. Within our framework, this result is
not totally proven because the impact of an increase in the stand value on the optimal level
of insurance coverage consists of three eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect involves the substitution eﬀect
of an increase in the stand value. This eﬀect is positive due to the higher stand value. The
second eﬀect involves an income eﬀect, since a higher stand value would raise overall wealth.
CARA preferences eliminate any income eﬀect. Under DARA and IARA, this income eﬀect
is positive and negative, respectively. The third eﬀect involves a loss eﬀect of an increase in
the stand value. This higher level of loss implies that the forest owner will purchase more
insurance. Finally, under CARA or IARA, all these eﬀects are not contradictory, making
the forest owner’s insurance demand higher when the stand value increases. Under DARA,
the aggregate eﬀect of an increase in the stand value is ambiguous4.
We can observe that under the DARA assumption, which is generally admitted, forest
owners may increase their insurance demand when the insurance price rises or when their risk
aversion increases. On the contrary, forest owners may reduce or increase their insurance
expenditures when their initial wealth increases. We can also observe that the decision
of private forest owners to insure against natural risks is strongly linked to the price of
insurance, the level of the stand value and their risk preferences. These factors can explain
the diversity of observed insurance behaviours.
2.2 Optimal insurance decision with a public programme
We now focus on the impact of public compensation programmes on optimal insurance de-
cisions. Private ﬁnancial loss due to a natural disaster is limited by compensation from the
4A complete set of comparative statics is available from the authors upon request.
8public disaster relief programme. Insurance decisions are made based on the knowledge of
this programme and prior to an observation of the severity of an impending disaster. Public
ﬁnancial help can take two forms. In the ﬁrst type of programme, the government ﬁnan-
cially compensates forest owners who are victims of natural disasters without any coverage
condition (France). In the second one, the payment of the public ﬁnancial post-disaster com-
pensation is contingent on coverage decisions (Denmark). Consequently, we analyse these
two situations.
We assume that the value of the private forest owner’s revenue ensured by the programme
after the occurrence of a disaster does not fall below some minimal value Rm, independent of
insurance coverage. The level of this value is determined by social and political considerations
and is public knowledge. This implies that the choice of Rm does not depend on the optimal
insurance activity.
The private forest owner chooses the level of insurance to maximise her/his expected




U [R − (1 − α)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f (ε)dε+ (3)
Z ε
b ε
U [Rm + R − (1 − α)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f (ε)dε
The variable b ε is deﬁned by the public relief programme and it is the threshold state of
nature that deﬁnes the public assistance limit for ﬁnancial loss.
















(L(R,ε)−(1+λ) (R))f (ε)dε = 0
(4)
where c W = R−(1−b α)L(R,ε)−(1+λ)b α (R) is the forest owner’s ﬁnal wealth without public
ﬁnancial assistance, and d Wm = Rm +R −(1− b α)L(R,ε)−(1 + λ) b α (R) is the ﬁnal wealth
with the public compensation programme. It is interesting to compare the optimal level
of insurance obtained with public programme b α to the optimal level of insurance obtained
without public programme α∗. We evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition (4) deﬁning b α at α∗. We
note that EU(α) is concave in α. It is easy to show that
dEU(α)
α |α∗ < 0 where the inequality
follows from the concavity of U. This last expression equals zero by the ﬁrst order condition
for b α. Since EU(α) is concave in α, the inequality implies that α∗ > b α. The existence of
a public compensation programme has the eﬀect of lowering the optimal level of insurance
coverage.
The public post-disaster programme aﬀects the optimal insurance decision of the forest
owner by the threshold of compensation b ε and the minimal value Rm. Therefore, we can
analyse the eﬀect of change in public compensation programmes through b ε or Rm on opti-




























(L(R, b ε) − (1 + λ) (R))
10where c W|b ε = R − (1 − b α)L(R, b ε) − (1 + λ)b α (R) and d Wm|b ε = Rm + R − (1 − b α)L(R, b ε) −











term (L(R, b ε) − (1 + λ) (R)) can be positive or negative. For a given R, in the case of











< 0. A threshold state of nature b ε∗
exists, deﬁned by L
 
R, b ε∗￿
= (1 + λ) (R).
Proposition 1 : If the public assistance programme only occurs for exceptional disasters,
then forest owners respond to greater uncertainty about the size of loss by increasing their
optimal insurance demand. The existence of public compensation for natural disasters with
state greater than b ε has the eﬀect of improving the distribution of states of nature over
which forest owners bear full ﬁnancial loss. It may be immediately deduced from this that
the optimal level of insurance coverage will increase. If the public compensation programme
exists for small disasters, then forest owners decrease their optimal level of insurance when
the government raises the compensation threshold to the level of the state of nature threshold,
b ε∗. The increase of the distribution of states of nature over which forest owners bear full
ﬁnancial loss makes the optimal level of insurance coverage lower.
When the threshold of compensation is higher, the government intervenes more rarely;
forest owners then react by increasing their insurance demand. This result is consistent
with Birot and Gollier’s conclusion. Therefore, when public ﬁnancial assistance is scarce,
forest owners prefer to protect themselves by taking out insurance contracts. The incentive
to insure is thus decreased due to the existence of a public ﬁnancial assistance programme.
Anticipating the existence of such a programme, forest owners do not take eﬃcient measures
11to insure against natural disasters because they are partially insured against ﬁnancial loss
by a public relief programme. Browne and Hoyt (2000) deﬁne this behaviour as "charity
hazard". Forest owners’ failure to purchase insurance is a consequence of the compensation
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Proposition 2 : If the public programme is established for exceptional windstorms, then
an increase in the minimum value of revenue guaranteed by public compensation reduces the
forest owners’ loss of damage, leading to greater ineﬃciency in private insurance coverage.
If the public programme is set up for small disasters, a higher guaranteed revenue increases
the optimal level of insurance coverage.
Generally, the public relief programme is implemented for exceptional disasters. In this
case, increased public disaster relief payments are associated with reduced insurance pur-
chases. This conclusion can explain why so few private forest owners are insured against
natural disasters.
We now consider that the public assistance level depends on the forest owner’s insurance
decision. Within this context, the forest owner decides to insure if her/his expected utility
12with the insurance and public programme is greater than her/his expected utility without
insurance: α > 0 if:
Z b ε
0
U [R − (1 − α)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f (ε)dε+ (5)
Z ε
b ε
U [Rm + R − (1 − α)L(R,ε) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f (ε)dε >
Z ε
0
U [R − L(R,ε)]f (ε)dε
Since it is very diﬃcult to directly verify if this inequality (5) is satisﬁed without function
speciﬁcation, we assume that the assistance level is proportional to the insurance choice:
αRm. Moreover, we consider that when α increases, public assistance also increases. This
type of programme considers that insurance coverage is easily observable by the governmnent.





U[R − (1 − α)L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f(ǫ)dǫ+ (6)
Z ǫ
b ǫ
U[αRm + R − (1 − α)L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ)α (R)]f(ǫ)dǫ
The optimal level of insurance when the public programme is adapted to insurance con-








′(d Wmc)[Rm+L(R,ǫ)−(1+λ) (R)]f(ǫ)dǫ (7)
where c Wc = R−(1− b αc)L(R,ǫ)−(1+λ)b αc (R) et d Wmc = b αcRm +R−(1−α)L(R,ǫ)−
(1 + λ)b αc (R).
13By comparing condition (7) evaluated at b α with condition (4) deﬁning b α, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3 : Adapting public ﬁnancial assistance programmes to insurance coverage
makes insurance more attractive for forest owners. The existence of public compensation
for disasters subject to coverage has the eﬀect of increasing the optimal level of insurance,
although the public programme reduces the forest owner’s loss of damage, leading to lower
eﬃciency in private insurance.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix A. In fact, the insurance demand is higher
when the public programme is contingent on insurance coverage than when it is not the case.
3 Optimal forest management activity with a public pro-
gramme
We consider forest management activities such as the installation of artiﬁcial ﬁrebreaks
that mitigate the size of natural disaster losses. These coverage practices are self-insurance
activities. We only consider the protection objective of forest management actions against
natural hazards here, but there may be other ones such as the interest for non-timber services
provided by the forest (fruit crops, leisure activities, etc). In the economic literature, self-
insurance activities have been principally studied in a two-state model assuming an additive
loss function (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Briys and Schlesinger,
1990; Schlesinger, 2000, among others). In Stenger (2004), forest owners’ decisions of self-
insurance toward natural risk are investigated through experiments. She shows that if the
14forest owner decides to invest in self-insurance activities, then the amount of money allocated
to these expenses is high.
We propose a theoretical multiple-state model of forest management activities here where
the loss is a function of stand value. We ﬁrst analyse the forest management decision of
a private forest owner without a public assistance programme. We then study this choice
within the context of a public ﬁnancial assistance programme. We use the same framework
here as in the insurance case.
3.1 Optimal forest management decision without a public assis-
tance programme
Let L(R,q,ε) denote the size of loss, given forest management activity q, with 0 ≤ L(R,q,ε) ≤
R. When the timber revenue increases, ﬁnancial loss rises as well: LR (R,q,ε) ≥ 0. An in-
crease in q reduces the size of loss at any given ε, so that Lq (R,q,ε) ≤ 0 with strict inequality





U [R − L(R,q,ε) − cq]f (ε)dε (8)
where cq denotes the cost of forest practices q. Since U′ > 0, an interior solution referred to
as q∗, exists if Lq(R,0,ǫ) +c < 0 for all possible values of ǫ and R. At the optimal level, q∗,
the potential marginal beneﬁt, −Lq, must be at least greater than the cost of the increase









∗,ε) − c)f (ε)dε = 0 (9)
15where W ∗ = R − L(R,q∗,ε) − cq∗. For the rest of the paper, we assume that we have an
interior solution.
The ﬁrst-order condition given (9) has an immediate conventional interpretation in terms
of cost and beneﬁt; it states that, at the optimal level of forest management activity, the
expected marginal beneﬁt from the reduction in the size of a loss, E{U′ [W ∗](−Lq (R,q∗,ε))},
equals the expected marginal cost from the increase in forest practices, E{U′ [W ∗](c)}. The
second-order condition is satisﬁed if the loss function is convex. This logical assumption
means that a reduction in the size of loss becomes more diﬃcult as forest management
activities increase. These characteristics are assumed afterwards.
Optimal activity of forest management, q∗, depends on the marginal cost of this activity,
c, on risk preferences, and on the value of the stand5, R.
Risk-neutral forest owners always reduce their optimal activity when the price of these
measures increases. This result is not always veriﬁed when forest owners are risk averse.
The sign of
dA[W∗]
dW and the sign of Lqε are important. Consideration of many states of nature
enables us to deﬁne forest management activity as either a risky or a risk-reducing activity.
The technology of protection is then described by the relationship between the marginal
return to forest management activity, Lq, and the random severity of a natural disaster, ε.
For example, if the forest owner exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, then A[W] is positive
and constant. When Lqε < 0, expenditures on forest management practices are regarded
by the private forest owner as being a "risk-reducing" investment. These include smoke
detectors and auxiliary generators for use in blackouts, for example, because the marginal
return to expenditure on forest management activity (−Lq) varies directly with the severity
5 A complete set of comparative statics is available from the authors upon request.
16of the disaster since higher values of ε are assumed to correspond to relatively more severe
disasters; therefore Lε > 0. When Lqε > 0, expenditure on forest management practices is
a "risky" asset, for example the installation of ﬁre retardants, because the marginal return
of such an activity varies inversely with disaster severity. An increase in forest management
activity cost induces a decrease in optimal forest management activity only: (a) if forest
owners exhibit constant absolute risk aversion; (b) if they exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion, and investment in forest management practice is a risky expenditure; (c) if they
exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion, and investment in forest management practices is
a risk-reducing expenditure. These results are consistent with the ones obtained by Mahul
(1998). The result that an increase in self-insurance activity cost induces a decrease in
optimal self-insurance activity depends on the absolute risk aversion and the investment
features. When forest owners exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (that is generally
accepted), they will reduce their coverage when the cost of coverage increases only if the
marginal return of such activity is more important in the states of nature with low levels of
damage.
If investment in forest management activity is a risk-reducing (risky) expenditure, more
risk-averse private forest owners invest more (less) in coverage activity. In fact, when invest-
ment in forest management activity is a risk-reducing expenditure, the more unfavorable the
states of nature are, the higher the marginal return of coverage expenses is. Therefore, a
more risk-averse forest owner spends more on coverage activity. Inversely, when investment
in forest management activity is a risky expenditure, the marginal return is then more im-
portant in the favourable states. Consequently, more risk-averse forest owners invest less in
forest practices.
17If the forest owner’s stand value changes but the loss exposure remains the same, will
she/he choose more or less forest management activities? Note that risk-neutral forest
owners increase (decrease) their optimal forest management activity for a higher stand value
if LRq < 0 (> 0). If forest management practices are more proﬁtable for high revenues
of timber production (that is, LRq < 0: if R increases, then Lq decreases; therefore, the
marginal return of forest practices rises), then risk-neutral forest owners choose a higher
level of forest management activities. This result has not been veriﬁed for risk-averse forest
owners. If forest management activities are proﬁtable at all the states of nature, then risk-
averse forest owners only decrease their optimal level of forest practices for a higher stand
value if LRq > 0; otherwise, their behaviour remains ambiguous.
The cost of forest management activities, the risk preferences of the private forest owner
and the value of the stand are fundamental factors explaining the decision to self-insure
against natural risks.
3.2 Optimal forest management activity with a public programme
We now assume that the same public assistance programme as the one deﬁned in the case
of insurance is implemented. This programme may or may not be implemented, depending
on the optimal forest management activity, but the forest management decision depends on
the knowledge of the existence of this programme. We therefore analyse these two cases.
First, the ﬁnancial public compensation programme is independent of the optimal forest
management activity chosen by the forest owner facing natural risk.
The private forest owner chooses the level of forest management activity to maximise





U [R − L(R,q,ε) − cq]f (ε)dε+
Z ε
b ε
U [Rm + R − L(R,q,ε) − cq]f (ε)dε
(10)
The ﬁrst term in (10) reﬂects the forest owner’s wealth with no compensation of loss,
while the second term represents the level of revenue guaranteed to the forest owner by
public compensation.

















(−Lq (R, b q,ε) − c)f (ε)dε = 0 (11)
where c W = R − L(R, b q,ε) − cb q and d Wm = Rm + R − L(R, b q,ε) − cb q.
According to our assumptions, the second-order condition is veriﬁed. The private forest
owner purchases forest management activity up to the point where the marginal utility
obtained from such expenditures equals zero over all the states of nature.
We compare the optimal level of forest management activity obtained with public pro-
gramme b q to the optimal level of forest management activity obtained without the public
programme q∗. We evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition (11), deﬁning b q at q∗. We note that
EUs(q) is concave in q. It is easy to show that
dEUs(q)
q |q∗ < 0 where the inequality follows
from the concavity of U. This last expression equals zero by the ﬁrst-order condition for q.
Since EUs(q) is concave in q, the inequality implies that q∗ > b q. The existence of a public
compensation programme has the eﬀect of lowering the optimal level of forest management
19activity.
The public ﬁnancial assistance programme is deﬁned by the threshold of compensation b ε
and the minimal value Rm. Therefore, these two parameters aﬀect the optimal forest man-
agement decision of the forest owner. We can then analyse the eﬀect of change in public



















(−Lq (R, b q,b ε) − c)
where c W|b ε = R−L(R, b q,b ε)−cb q and d Wm|b ε = Rm+R−L(R, b q,b ε)−cb q, that is, depending on
the sign of the term (−Lq (R, b q,b ε) − c) because U′ is decreasing. For a given R, the sign of
the term (−Lq (R, b q,b ε)−c) directly depends on the comparison of the marginal beneﬁt from
the reduction in the size of a loss, (−Lq (R,q,ε)), and the marginal cost from the increase
in forest management activity, c, at the threshold state of nature b ε.
If forest management activity is a risk-reducing activity, then for exceptional disasters (b ε











< 0. If forest management activity is a
risky activity then, for exceptional disasters, the marginal beneﬁt is lower than the marginal











Proposition 4 : If forest management activity is a risk-reducing (risky) activity, then a
decrease in the threshold state of nature that limits public compensation has a direct eﬀect
20on the forest owner’s incentive to manage forest activity: since the government assumes less
ﬁnancial loss, the optimal level of forest management activity becomes higher (lower) for














(−Lq (R, b q,ε) − c)f (ε)dε





< 0 ⇔ cov(A[d Wm],−Lq(R, b q,ε)) > 0
If forest management activity is a risk-reducing activity and the preferences of the forest






forest management activity is a risky investment then, under IARA, we have
cov(A[d Wm],−Lq(R, b q,ε)) > 0.
Proposition 5 :
An increase in the revenue guaranteed by public compensation Rm decreases the optimal
level of forest management activity:
− if forest management activity is a risk-reducing activity and forest owners exhibit de-
creasing absolute risk aversion
− or if forest management activity is a risky expenditure and the preferences of the forest
owners increase absolute risk aversion.
21Indeed, forest owners observe that the government increases its assistance, leading them to
reduce their forest management activities, since a larger part of the damage expenditures is
assumed by a public programme. Consequently, if a public compensation programme exists,
private forest owners may reduce their forest management expenditures. This conclusion
can explain why so little forest management behaviour against natural disaster is observed.
We now consider that the public compensation level depends on the owner’s forest man-
agement activity. In this context, forest owners decide to adopt forest management activity
if their expected utility with such a practice and public programme is greater than their
expected utility without forest management activity: q > 0 if:
Z b ε
0
U [R − L(R,q,ε) − cq]f (ε)dε +
Z ε
b ε




U [R − L(R,0,ε)]f (ε)dε
Since it is very diﬃcult to directly verify if this inequality (12) is satisﬁed without function
speciﬁcation, we assume that the public assistance programme depends on the forest man-
agement activities as follows: Rp(q) with R′ > 0 and Rp(q) ≤ Rm∀q. Moreover, we assume
that when q increases, public assistance increases as well. This type of public programme
requires monitoring, but it is possible to oberve the forest management activities undertaken
by non-industrial private forest owners. As an example, the preparation of the forest path
to make access easier in the event of a ﬁre is an easily observable action.




U[R − L(R,q,ǫ) − cq]f(ǫ)dǫ +
Z ǫ
b ǫ
U[Rp(q) + R − L(R,q,ǫ) − cq]f(ǫ)dǫ (13)











p(b qc) − Lq(R, b qc,ǫ) − c]f(ǫ)dǫ (14)
with c Wc = R − L(R, b qc,ǫ) − cb qc and d Wmc = Rp(b qc) + R − L(R, b qc,ǫ) − cb qc.
By comparing this ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at b q deﬁned by (11), we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 : The existence of public ﬁnancial assistance programmes based on forest
management activities has the eﬀect of changing the optimal level of forest management
activities. Forest owners respond to the measure of adapting public assistance to coverage
decisions by increasing their expenditures on forest management activities. This adaptation
compensates the reduction of the forest owners’ resulting damage due to the presence of public
compensation.
The optimal level of forest management activities when the public programme depends on
these practices is greater than the optimal one when the public post-disaster compensation
programme is independent of forest management activity6.
6The demonstration of this result uses the same methodology as the one exposed in Appendix A; please
refer to it for more details.
234 Implications of public policy
After an exceptional natural disaster, governments provide some ﬁnancial assistance to fa-
cilitate the recovery of unprotected or protected victim-forest owners. The existence of such
public ﬁnancial compensation inﬂuences forest owners’ activities to protect their forest from
natural damage. Providing assistance after a catastrophe reduces the incentives of forest
owners to invest in protective measures prior to a disaster. The ineﬃciency of government
assistance as a form of insurance following a major disaster is due to the fact that the govern-
ment deﬁnes such a programme regardless of the disincentives created by this compensation
for eﬃcient insurance or forest management activities. Expectation of ﬁnancial assistance
after a natural disaster has occurred aﬀects the forest owner’s interest in voluntarily purchas-
ing insurance or forest management activities prior to a catastrophe. Since the government
assumes more ﬁnancial loss, optimal private expenditures on insurance or forest management
activity are reduced. An increase in forest value, the cost of protective measures, and risk
aversion are also found to exacerbate this divergence.
We will now examine four types of government policies: (1) direct monitoring of private
expenditures on protective measures; (2) a tax on each forest owner; (3) a per-unit subsidy for
insurance or forest management activity; and (4) a combination of public/private measures.
Our previous analysis provides the necessary information to evaluate each of these policies.
4.1 Direct monitoring
Indemnities paid by public programmes must be based on the prevention and coverage eﬀorts
that forest owners undertake. This means that forest owners who adopt insurance or forest
24management measures will be indemniﬁed or they will at least receive more than those who
do not. It is entirely possible to monitor the eﬀorts provided by forest owners. Indeed, if
forest owners are insured, they have a forest insurance contract. For example, in Denmark,
after a natural catastrophe occurrs, private forest owners receive subsidies for clearing and
replanting new forests only if they have subscribed to a basic windstorm-type insurance.
Replanting has to be with wind-resistant tree species and overall replanting should also
aim at making a wind-resistant forest. This type of behaviour encourages private forest
owners to adopt insurance coverage. In the same way, if forest owners engage in forest
management activities, then activities of this type that facilitate the intervention in case
of ﬁre or windstorm are easy to observe ex-ante and ex-post. Thus, when the government
decides to attribute compensations, an expert can be sent to see the forest owners in order to
evaluate the damage and the prevention eﬀorts made. Of course, monitoring and enforcement
are relatively expensive. Coverage is assumed to be voluntary. The government can also
require that forest owners who receive disaster assistance purchase coverage. Receiving
public assistance following a disaster forces forest owners to invest in protective measures.
4.2 Taxation
The government can implement a tax on each stand value. Taxation may increase forest
owners’ incentives to purchase private insurance or to increase forest management activities.
Such a tax reduces the wealth of the forest owners. We have previously shown that when a
reduction in initial wealth occurs, forest owners then increase their insurance demand (under
the generally accepted DARA assumption), and their forest management activities only if
forest management activity is less proﬁtable when the stand value is high. Otherwise, the tax
25may have a perverse eﬀect on forest management activity. Therefore, it is not obvious that
ﬁnancing the public assistance programme by taxing forest owners’ stands induces incentives
to protect against natural disasters. Only the money collected via the tax could allow the
government to create a fund intended to ﬁnance public programmes.
4.3 Subsidies
The risk that a major catastrophe will lead to more government compensation requires in-
surers to charge even higher prices. A factor that limits the demand for private disaster
coverage is the high cost of coverage that substantially reduces the remaining revenue of
some low-income forest owners. The public sector may pay direct subsidies as a percentage
of insurance premiums, that is, the greater the risk, the greater the subsidy, or of the cost
of forest management activities in the form of low-interest loans or grants. The government
can implement a per-unit subsidy for insurance or forest management activity in order to
inﬂuence the behaviour of the forest owner. For example, in Germany, Länders pay 50% of
the ﬁre insurance premium and the public decision-maker can grant ﬁnancial aid to forest
owners that subscribe to an insurance contract. This measure decreases the cost of insur-
ance. As previously found, in the case of DARA, a decrease of the price of insurance induces
a decrease of insurance demand. Such a means can have perverse eﬀects. In the same way,
the government can bear a part of the forest management activity cost. For example, the
government can subsidise forest owners who maintain their access roads in good condition
in case of natural disasters. In such a context, forest owners will increase their forest man-
agement activity only if they present decreasing absolute risk aversion and if this activity
is risk-reducing; these conditions are generally veriﬁed. However, a resulting problem may
26appear. Forest owners choose not to invest in coverage even when their rates are highly
subsidised because they perceive the likehood of a natural catastrophe to be very low.
4.4 A combination of public/private measures
Another public instrument is to oﬀer a potentially susbidised insurance and to then provide
disaster assistance to most of the forest owners who decline coverage. Natural disaster losses
can be covered by a combination of public and private sectors as described in the following
system. Forest management practices and private insurance are chosen by the forest owners
to avoid moral hazard problems that might otherwise occur if they behaved more carelessly
because they knew they were fully protected against natural risks. The government can
heavily subsidise these coverage measures. Private insurance is administrated by private in-
surers that deﬁne the amounts of coverage according to their surplus, their current portfolio,
and their ability to diversify risks. The private sector risk transfer mechanism corresponds
to government reinsurance that would only serve to make the initial insurance premium
lower or the availibility of coverage greater. The diﬀerent levels of this coverage system are
administrated by the private sector. The role of the government would be limited to helping
with the supply and demand for insurance.
5 Conclusion
In Europe, the occurrence of natural disasters has frequently elicited public ﬁnancial assis-
tance to compensate private forest owners, victims of these disasters. The limited ﬁnancial
loss created by such programmes may have an inﬂuence on the optimal levels of expenditure
27on market insurance and forest management activities. The relationships existing between
market insurance or forest management activity, and public relief programmes are analysed
in a simple expected utility model of private forest owner decisions in relation to the many
states of nature. We ﬁnd that the existence of public post-disaster programmes discourages
private forest owners from adopting eﬃcient insurance or forest management measures aimed
at protecting their forest.
The possibility for the forest owner to jointly insure and achieve forest management ac-
tivity is not analysed here. It could be interesting to show if the result obtained by Ehrlich
and Becker (1972) under a two-state model, that market insurance and self-insurance are
substitutes, can be extended to a multiple-state framework and to the existence of a public
post-disaster compensation programme. Data on forest owners’ decisions would yield more
accurate information about insurance and forest management activities and would allow us
to validate our theoretical conclusions. Such an analysis would help to quantify the potential
eﬀect of public assistance in the forest owner’s insurance and forest management programme.
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A Proof of proposition 3








′[b αRm + R − (1 − b α)L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ)b α (R)][Rm + L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ) (R)]f(ǫ)dǫ
We note that:
Rm + L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ) (R) ≥ L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ) (R)
and
Rm + R − (1 − b α)L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ)b α (R) ≥ b αRm + R − (1 − b α)L(R,ǫ) − (1 + λ)b α (R)
and, since U′(.) > 0:
U
′[Rm+R−(1− b α)L(R,ǫ)−(1+λ)b α (R)] ≤ U

























(L(R,ε)−(1+λ) (R))f (ε)dε = 0
We then conclude that b αc ≥ b α.
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